Yet another bites the dust

Yesterday the British government announced that it will use £700 million on new vehicles for the army. According to the BBC, this will include:

"...a new fleet of 400 heavy, medium and light support vehicles - called Wolfhound, Husky and Coyote - to carry out a range of tasks from field ambulances to ammunition supply 

for the Royal Artillery.

More than 100 new, larger and more heavily armoured tracked vehicles, which will be known as Warthog, will be replaced the Viking cross-country vehicle presently used for operations in 

Afghanistan.

The MoD has also pledged to buy a further 100 Jackal all-terrain vehicles.

A new type of specialist route clearance vehicle, called the Buffalo, is being developed to try and reduce the damage and death toll caused by roadside bombs and 

explosives." 

What this essentially means, is that the troubled "Future Rapid Effects System" (FRES) of the British Army is now a goner - it is not official, but there is simply no way that there will be a budget for the FRES program, and its hundreds of new vehicles based on the MOWAG Piranha 5 platform. It is toast. And with that, yet another "transformational program" has gone the way of the dodo, along with its light-wheeled vehicles. Many saw this as the future 

for armies during the 90's, and several countries, such as Canada and Belgium were to replace all their tracked vehicles with smaller, lighter and cheaper wheeled platforms. Canada has since then all but dismissed the idea, and is buying Leopard 2 MBTs again en-masse, what Military Technology last year referred to as "Transformation in Reverse." And now, the UK does the 

same, and is instead buying "more than 100 new, larger and more heavily armoured tracked vehicles."

However, this is no immediate vindication of heavy armour. The current Challenger 2 model being deployed to Iraq weighs close to 80 tons! Instead it is more of a vindication of the medium platform, as many of the vehicles bought under this new program are. One excellent such platform which I believe this program instead confirms the need for a medium platform, such as the ever-young CV90. This platform, the swiss-army-knife of vehicles, made as a fighting vehicles, twin 120 mm mortar carrier, air defence variant, command platform! The platform has performed excellently on deployment, both with Swedish forces in Africa and Norwegian forces in Afghanistan. This is the sort of platform we need more of. Well protected, modular, tracked, giving excellent mobility - this is the sort of platform that needs to be at the heart of future armed forces. 

And if you ever wondered why the Bradley has not had much in terms of export sales, and the CV90 has, the below video should be enlightening. 

"NATO Lacks Rules of Engagement to Fight Pirates"

Information Dissemination, 22 Oct. 2008

This is why I don't blame the Russians at all for making it clear they are doing their own thing. The west needs rule sets for piracy.

As I said yesterday...

Another one bites the dust...

Comanche's Child: The Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter
Defense Industry Daily, 19 October 2008

Again it should begin to become obvious that the current drive for ever more capable platforms without regard to time, cost and the capability required is counterproductive to the extreme. The ARH being cancelled shows that the problems are not isolated to naval forces or strike aircraft, but are part of a much larger problem that is ruining our abilities to create a force with the necessary volume to conduct effective operations.

Which president?

The US presidential race is heating up as it heads into its final weeks, and though it may not immediately appear to be related to Nordic security, it surely is. The difference between the two candidates in their approaches to world politics, and how to deal with issues relating to Russia, multilateral relations and trade all impact on our security.

On Russia, it is clear that the belligerent tone struck by in particular John McCain is very unhelpful. Though far from a democratic state in western terms, Russia still comprises an important part of the core, which we need to include more than exclude. The idea that we can "punish" Russia by refusing to cooperate and not including it into "world society" is ludicrous - we can no more do that than deciding that our left foot will not get more blood supply today (i.e. we can do it, but it will do us little good) Barack Obama strikes a somewhat more conciliatory tone, and though he does not exactly sing Russia's praises either, we stand to hope that he will be a more reasonable custodian of the relationship between Russia, the US and the western allies.

This feeds into the second point, which is multilateral relations. Vital to maintain the integrity of the core and to coordinate the work to integrate the gap, it has been sorely missing during the last eight years. The US has more often than not seen multilateralism more as a hindrance than an aid, and hence missed out on the opportunities offered to build international security institutions and to strengthen multilateral cooperation. This has meant that when we now face challenges such as fighting piracy in the Gulf of Aden, we have multiple countries, including Russia, Malaysia and India all sending vessels, but no overarching body or history of cooperation to step in and take leadeship. Multilateralism is at the heart of achieving such cooperation, and multilateralism is at the heart of the position of small states in the world. Again, John McCain, who feeds off a constituency which rather wants the UN out of the US than building bridges internationally, something which is far from being in the interests of small states.

The final point is also the only one where John McCain may have an advantage over his opponent. Senator Obama's flirting with the left has come at the cost of offering support for protectionist interests in the US. Free trade (and yes, fair trade) is at the heart of shrinking the gap and at the heart of the wealth of small states. Protectionism serves no one in the long run, it is giving in to short term interests of special interests and the fear of the outside, the "others." It is simply not the right way to go.

But on the balance - Barack Obama is the best for small states. His more balanced approach to Russia, his faith in multilateralism will be far better for us all, and despite his limited faith in the power of trade, he is still the most suitable candidate.

Better rules urgently needed

Exhibit A in support of the main tasks of Scandinavian states in a world of the Leviathan:

"Russian activity in the High North - The Arctic contest heats up
What is Russia up to in the seas above Europe?" The Economist, Oct. 9th 2008

This is what happens when you allow grey areas of rules to fester - someone will take advantage of them being grey, and seeing what color they like in it. In this case, Russia is seeing the color of the high north in their own particular tint, and are enforcing their version of the rules, and is setting itself up to have a far greater say in it than in the past. Oslo carries much of the blame here, as successive governments have been woefully complacant about the possibility that someone would actually seriously challenge their interpretation of the rules, particularly concerning Svalbard, and must now pay the price in terms of a much more difficult environment to work in than they had only a few years ago.

The irony of the story is that Norway in fact has one of the more capable SysAdmin forces available in the region, its Coast Guard, which despite continuing rivalries with the "real" navy for resources and prominence continues to do an excellent job, but without legitimate rules to enforce, they can do little.

As for the tone in the Economist article, which seems to suggest that Norway now is considering this as a conventional security threat, I'd advice against it. This is no direct threat, it is simply a question of a vacuum needing to be filled. If Norway allows Russia to dictate under which circumstances that will happen, then Russia will most likely also dictate much of the final outcome. But if Norways would be more pro-active in trying to define these circumstances themselves, and deny the Russians the opportunity to militarize the situation, the outcome may be quite another one.

Being small in the world of the Leviathan

As mentioned in the SOW of this blog, its intention will be to mark out the role of Scandinavia and other core small states in general in a world where the Leviathan rules supreme in conventional warfare. In short, they will have three significant roles:

1. Administration of its immediate surroundings. The connectivity and rule sets of the core are not evenly distributed throughout the territories and surroundings of the countries that compose it - there will be "grey areas" where rules are unclear, and where connectivity is fluid. For Scandinavia, this in particular concerns the areas of the high north, where the continuing security vacuum is of real concern. Obviously, this is not purely a military concern, and it will require the employment of both military and civilian means to obtain it, but it nonetheless needs to be done.
   
2. Contributing to the shrinking of the gap. Scandinavia has traditionally participated extensively in emergency aid, development aid and peace keeping operations. Unfortunately, too often these operations have served more to maintain the status quo than fostering real change in levels of connectivity, and have made few inroads towards shrinking the gap. This needs to change, and in order to achieve such change, the organization and use of military and civilian institutions and forces need to change first.
   
3. Facilitating and supporting the operations of the Leviathan. The Scandinavian countries will most likely only be able to participate directly in Leviathan operations, i.e. wars, through the provision of niche capabilities, such as special forces with a speciality in cold weather operations, meaning that their main role in such operations will be an indirect one. By this I do not mean that they should give the US a blank check of operations, rather that they should be prepared to support in legitimate operations through logistics, basing and intelligence.

As Dr. Barnett mentions himself in the beginning of "Blueprint for Action," Scandinavian forces such as the Norwegians feel "too small to join in any big wars and too peacekeeping oriented to beat back any bloody insurgencies..." Yet their niche still lays in the middle between the big wars and the traditional peacekeeping. No, they probably cannot join in the large wars, but they can definitely step up from the traditional peacekeeping and participate more forcefully in SysAdmin operations, as both Norway and particularly Denmark have proven in Afghanistan, and they can do this without compromising their national security needs. In fact, if force structures, which will be described in a later post, are adequately reformed, then participating in SysAdmin operations may just be one of the most fruitful and important undertakings of Scandinavia's armed forces.

(Picture: Norwegian Forces fire mortars at presumed Taleban positions during combat operations in Northern Afghanistan, 2007)

SysAdmin in practice

Danish flexible support ship Absalon in port in Valetta, Malta, en-route to the gulf of Aden to join TF-150 in the Gulf of Aden.

The vessel carries fast interceptor vessels, RIBs and helicopters, all powerful tools in the fight against piracy, and in enforcing global rule sets.

This is what we need more of - vessels capable of
sustained operations both far away as well as on our own shores, securing stability, "administrating the system."








Only thing that could have made this better - a Norwegian or Swedish, most likely the former, special operations team operating from this vessel in conjunction with the Danish crew.

Statement of Work

This blog is not a personal blog, nor is it a fan-blog or a political statement. It is simply an attempt by someone no longer offered the luxury of debate and testing of ideas found within academia to present and debate a world view, opinions and ideas, bad and good. Hopefully, some will find this interesting, and it will cause some fruitful discussion, and hopefully some better ideas than those initially brought to the table.

As the title header indicates, it intends to see defence, international relations, politics and security from a distinctly Scandinavian perspective. In order to illustrate this, the blog has taken the name of a Norwegian naval officer, Petter Wessel, later Tordenskiold (1690-1720) who served with the Danish-Norwegian fleet in the great Nordic War of 1700-1721. The choice illustrates the somewhat naval-centric view that probably will manifest itself, as well as the all-Scandinavian perspective it seeks to achieve to the issues it addresses.

Inspiration of a more academic kind comes from primarily two sources: The first is Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett, author and strategist, who has through his two books, "The Pentagon's New Map" and "Blueprint for Action" laid out a world view that is distinctly different from that which is usually adopted in discussions of international relations. Terms such as "the core" and "the gap", reffering to the core of globalized countries and the central gap of non-integrating countries will regularly be used. Other terms include "Leviathan" and "SysAdmin," which will be adopted to describe the different kind of forces that Dr. Barnett advocates - a Leviathan to fight high intensity wars and a SysAdmin force to expand and maintain "connectivity" using less intensive means.

The second source of inspiration comes from Stephen Biddle and his relentless work to document how the current drive for advanced military technology must be moderated by an understanding of the continued importance of skill, training, organization, and particularly "force employment" in military power. His work proves that it superiority in these later factors more than superior technology that has granted the US and its allies such easy victories in recent conflicts. Though technology certainly helps, it is far from as significant as often believed.

This is not to say that this will be a "fan-site" of any kind. Indeed, though heavily inspired by Dr. Barnett and his ideas, the blog will disagree with some of his opinions, such as his support for the invasion of Iraq. This will often be due to the fact that its perspective is deeply different from that of Barnett, as it sees the world from the point of view of a small Scandinavian country, not the US. Our priorities may differ, though our understanding of the surrounding world may conincide. In fact, rather than agreeing with Barnett, this blog will seek to see what the place of a small state in a system such as the one he describes will be, and how a smaller Scandinavian country should act and organize to best fulfill its role.

Neither will this blog be in any way techno-sceptic nor "luddite" in any way. Rather, it will advocate a more moderate approach to technology, one which will be more in line with the priorities of a small Scandinavian country.

Based on these influences, this blog will make a few basic assumptions that will shape its analysis and understanding:

• Military power can be a force for good in the world - rather than being demonized and marginalized, it should be forged into a more useful tool than it currently is (along the lines of Dr. Barnett's propositions)
• Small states such as Norway, Denmark and even Sweden cannot realistically hope to become "Leviathans" in their own right. Their armed forces should therefore reorganize distinctly towards a structure more suited for SysAdmin work, and in high-intensity combat rely more on highly-skilled small unit operations, exploiting the weakness of major armies who struggle when faced with such operations.
• SysAdmin is not just important in the gap - it needs to be conducted within the territories of the core countries as well, in order to maintain and improve the current level of connectivity.
  
• Highly advanced military equipment needs to better balance cost and capabilities if it is to justify its continued focus. Particularly for smaller states, the immense increase in cost seen in recent years risks trunkating continued development, and eat up funding intended for training and reorganization, effectively reducing their overall combat capabilities.

Others will almost certainly be added as time goes on, though these will remain among the most central contentions. Again, this blog does not intend to allign itself religiously to any of the scholars above, but rather to adapt their ideas and theories, originally written with large powers in mind to a Scandinavian and small state perspective. What is our place in the world, how can be participate, how can we make our contribution a valuable one? These are the themes that hopefulyl will be adressed in the time to come.